On 30th July 2024, when considering Application number 88/21/2, the Court of Appeal was tasked with deciding two primary issues and grievances brought forward by the appellants against the decision of the First Court. These were the appropriate multiplier for calculating the victim’s loss of future earnings, and moral damages following Act XIII of 2018. By addressing these pertinent legal issues, the Court sought to establish clear guidelines for the quantification of damages in personal injury cases, an area which has been marked by inconsistent judicial interpretations surrounding notions of lucrum cessans and damnum emergens.

In its decision, the First Court had considered that the multiplier to be used when calculating the damages owed to the applicant, who was fifty-eight years old at the time of the accident, was that of 12 years. In establishing this 12-year multiplier to determine the victim’s loss of future earnings, the First Court considered the victim’s background as a healthy businessman who, prior to the accident, was expected to continue working well beyond the retirement age. However, the Court of Appeal dismissed these considerations made by the First Court and agreed with the arguments brought forward by the appellants. The Court considered the current trend of most workers, whether employed or self-employed, working beyond retirement age and noted that the victim’s situation was not one that could be deemed exceptional. While acknowledging current trends, the Court emphasised the inherent uncertainties of the future, asserting that the statutory retirement age should be the standard when determining the appropriate multiplier, rather than relying on the victim’s individual circumstances. The Court sought to promote an objective approach towards judicial uniformity. Consequently, the multiplier was reduced from 12 years to 6 years to better reflect the current statutory retirement age.

The second point of contention and basis for the appeal centered around the First Court’s decision to award €7,000 to the victim for ongoing pain, changes in familial life, and the inability to continue participating in his favourite sport. The appellants contended that, although the First Court did not label this form of compensation as moral damages, it effectively constituted exactly that.

It is worth remarking that the general statutory rule in Maltese law serving as the foundation of liability in personal injury cases is that one must be held accountable for damages caused by their own fault. Prior to 2018, the law did not expressly exclude moral damages, however, in virtue of Act XIII of 2018, the Maltese legislator limited such damages to specific offences mentioned in the law. Involuntary offences, such as the one in question, are expressly barred from the scope of this provision. Therefore, the Court decided that since the award of non-pecuniary damages is an exception, the general rule dictates that such damages cannot be awarded. In this way, the Court, adhering to a strict interpretation of the law, provided a clear resolution to an issue fraught with ambiguity: moral damages are to be awarded exclusively in the specific instances permitted by law.

The Court considered that despite strong arguments advocating for the inclusion of moral damages within the local legal framework, the prevailing judicial consensus favoured their exclusion. The argument against moral damages was, according to the Court, given the coup de grâce by the Maltese Legislator through Act XIII of 2018 which considers the entitlement to non-pecuniary damages for victims of specific criminal offences. That considered, by expressly indicating the circumstances under which non-pecuniary damages can be granted, the Legislator has made this form of damages the exception to the rule. Therefore, the general rule emerging from this is that these types of damages are not to be awarded unless falling within the exceptions contemplated in the law and are inapplicable for involuntary criminal offences.

The Court thereby accepted the grievances brought forward by the appellants reducing the liquidated damages from €92,033.75 to €41,328.

The appellants were represented by Dr Christine Calleja, Dr Kirk Brincau and Dr Paula Briffa of Mamo TCV Advocates.