Seventh Circuit Gives New Life to Consumer Data Breach Class Action
by Ronald W. Breaux, Daniel H. Gold, Emily Black, Timothy Newman, William Marsh
The Seventh Circuit has revived a class action against
Neiman Marcus for losses customers allegedly suffered as a result of a data
breach involving payment card information. A federal district court had
dismissed the claims, finding – consistent with federal courts around the
country – that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they failed to allege
they suffered concrete harm from the breach. The Seventh Circuit reversed that
decision, perhaps signaling a more widespread reexamination of standing in the
data breach context.
Background
In January 2014, Neiman Marcus announced that it had suffered a data breach
involving customer payment card information. In a letter to its customers, Neiman
Marcus reported that information from up to 350,000 payment cards was exposed
to malware installed on its system and that 9,200 card accounts had experienced
fraudulent activity. The company stated there was no indication that any
customer personally identifiable information (“PII”) (such as social security
numbers or birth dates) was ever at risk.
In March 2014, several customers who had used payment cards at Neiman Marcus
during the breach period brought a class action alleging, among other things, that
Neiman Marcus was negligent in securing customer payment card information.
Despite Neiman Marcus’ assurance to the contrary, the plaintiffs also alleged
that the hackers accessed PII.
In its motion to dismiss, Neiman Marcus argued that the plaintiffs did not have
standing to pursue the case because (1) the plaintiffs were reimbursed for all
fraudulent charges made on their accounts, and (2) the risk that they may
suffer identity theft in the future did not qualify as the “certainly
impending” harm required by Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, et al., 133
S. Ct. 1138 (2013). In Clapper – a case commonly cited by courts dismissing
data breach plaintiffs’ claims for lack of standing – the Supreme Court held
that threatened injury must be “certainly impending” to establish injury
sufficient for standing. Potential future injury is not enough (find further
discussion of the impact of Clapper here). Finding Neiman Marcus’ arguments
persuasive, the district court dismissed the case without prejudice.
The Seventh Circuit’s Opinion
The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court, finding that the 9,200 Neiman
Marcus customers who had suffered fraudulent charges on their accounts had
unquestionably experienced actual injury. The court held that even if the fraudulent
charges were fully reimbursed by the banks, there were “identifiable costs
associated with the process of sorting things out.” (Elsewhere, the court
referred to “the aggravation and loss of value of the time needed to set things
straight, to reset payment associations after credit card numbers are changed,
and to pursue relief for unauthorized charges.”) These identifiable costs
constituted an actual injury sufficient to confer standing on these plaintiffs.
The court also found that even class members who did not have fraudulent
charges on their accounts had standing. Emphasizing that there was an
“objectively reasonable likelihood” that fraudulent charges or identity theft
would occur in the future, the court stated that “Neiman Marcus customers
should not have to wait until hackers commit identity theft or credit-card
fraud in order to give the class standing.”
Moreover, the court held that any mitigation costs, such as the costs of credit
monitoring and identity theft protection “easily qualifie[d] as concrete
injury.” In Clapper, the Supreme Court held that mitigation expenses did not
qualify as actual injury where the harm was not imminent. But the Seventh
Circuit distinguished the speculative harm in Clapper, which involved claims
that the government may have intercepted confidential communications between
the plaintiffs and their clients, from the harm allegedly present here. “Neiman
Marcus does not contest the fact that the initial breach took place. An
affected customer, having been notified by Neiman Marcus that her card is at
risk, might think it necessary to subscribe to a service that offers monthly
credit monitoring.”
Interestingly, the court cited Neiman Marcus’ offer of one year of credit
monitoring and identity theft protection to customers – a standard practice for
breached companies – as additional evidence of concrete harm. “It is unlikely
that [Neiman Marcus] did so because the risk is so ephemeral that it can safely
be disregarded.” This is directly contrary to the approach of other courts,
which have found that providing free credit monitoring to affected consumers
can negate standing because it decreases the risk that a consumer experiences
any actual harm. See, e.g., Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 998 F. Supp.
2d 646, 654 (S.D. Ohio 2014).
The court was also not persuaded by Neiman Marcus’ argument that all fraudulent
charges had been and would continue to be reimbursed. It cited mitigation
expenses already incurred by the plaintiffs in attempt to avoid future
fraudulent charges, and future injury that may not be reimbursed. The court
noted that although many credit card companies offered customers “zero
liability policies,” the “zero liability” feature was a business practice, not
a legal obligation. Federal law only requires that a customer’s liability for
unauthorized use of a credit card not exceed $50, and debit cards receive
somewhat less protection. The court stated there was no guarantee that card
issuers would fully reimburse customers for fraudulent charges in the future.
Bellwether or Outlier?
The Seventh Circuit’s standing analysis conflicts with the way most courts have
addressed standing in data breach cases in the wake of Clapper. Most courts
have found that the potential for fraudulent charges in the future is not
sufficiently “imminent” to establish standing and that such risk does not meet
the “certainly impending” standard. See, e.g., In re Zappos.com, Inc., 2015 WL
3466943, at *1 (D. Nev. June 1, 2015); Green v. eBay, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 58047, at *2 (May 4, 2015); Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 998 F.
Supp. 2d 646, 654 (S.D. Ohio 2014).
Companies should expect plaintiffs’ attorneys to rely heavily on the Neiman
Marcus opinion going forward. For example, customers are seeking to revive a
data breach class action against Barnes & Noble after it was dismissed for
lack of standing in 2013. See In re Barnes & Noble Pin Pad Litig., 2013 WL
4759588 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 2013). Barnes & Noble argues that even under
the logic of the Seventh Circuit’s Neiman Marcus decision, the plaintiffs have
not adequately pled standing because they have not shown that their information
was actually impacted by the breach.
Standing continues to be a central issue in data breach class action
litigation. Companies with consumer-facing operations should monitor
developments in this area, because the law on standing in the data breach
context is far from settled.