Member Article

Academics and commentators in general have always been interested in the study of the enforcement process in regulatory agencies. In the last years, with the rise of the regulatory state[1] and thus the increased number of regulatory agencies, the number of studies has only increased. There is an important amount of literature on the subject and an increasing number of theories and models to explain regulatory enforcement. However, most of this literature is concerned with enforcement processes in developed, common law countries and consequently, a lack of regulatory studies is identified for developing countries and especially, for enforcement processes in developing countries with a civil law background. This lack of information is increased when looking at competition agencies as many commentators have tended to disassociate competition from regulation, in reality seeing them as opposed. This study is an attempt to understand the enforcement processes followed by a competition agency in a developing civil law country and trying to identify its main characteristics and its causes. It draws on the main literature on the subject, especially the responsive regulation model and the regulatory space and dispersed regulatory action paradigms and reflects on similarities and differences in this specified case of a Mexican agency.

 

Footnotes: [1] G. Majone, “From the Positive to the Regulatory State: Causes and Consequences of Changes in the Mode of Governance”, Journal of Public Policy, 17 (2), 1997. p.139.